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Autonomy and Alienated Subjectivity: A re-reading of 
Castoriadis, through Žižek 
 
Dr. David S. Moon 
Abstract 
In a time of political passivism in the Western democracies, this article argues for the 
value of Cornelius Castoriadis’s radical theory of autonomy as a means of 
conceptualising (wo)man’s ability to pro-actively create new social institutions ex nihlo. 
In making this argument, however, it also seeks to ‘correct’ a key flaw within the model 
of subjectivity underlying this theory of autonomy. Castoriadis’s attempts to bypass the 
notion of alienation as a metaphysical given led him to an internally contradictory 
conception of subjectivity based around an originary monadic psyche. Through a 
critical re-reading of Castoriadis’s position through that of Slavoj Žižek’s 
‘transcendental materialist theory of subjectivity’, this article shows how (re)inserting 
alienation into the former’s work as a constitutive element of the autonomous subject 
makes it possible to overcome the aforementioned contradiction whilst maintaining a 
concept of radical autonomous social change that goes beyond Žižek’s own rather 
inactive idea of ‘the Act’. 
Keywords: Autonomy; Alienation; Cornelius Castoriadis; Slavoj Žižek  
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Disagreements over the concept of autonomy are a key facet of debates over 
subjectivity. Their importance goes much further, however, in so far as autonomy is 
linked with the quality of society, of politics, and of democracy. All of these are seen as 
in decline in Europe in a historical period arguably characterised by a disengaged, ‘anti-
political’ consensus (Democratic Audit, 2012). A means of understanding autonomy 
which links questions of subjectivity to radical, political activity is therefore vital. 
This article asserts that such a means is offered by Cornelius Castoriadis, one of the 
foremost theorists of autonomy, his radical conceptualisation of which is based around 
a specific psychoanalytically derived model of subjectivity. In so doing it echoes the 
arguments already made by others such as Yannis Stavrakakis that Castoriadis’s 
conceptualisation of subjectivity is internally flawed, but goes beyond such critiques to 
argue that this need not mean that his far-reaching vision of autonomy be abandoned on 
the basis that the key flaw can be corrected with only minor repercussions for the latter.  
The solution outlined here is to retreat to an imagined position before Castoriadis’s 
theoretical mis-step and continue forward again along a different path. This endeavour 
is made easier due to the remarkable similarities up until this imaginary point between 
the theory of subjectivity pronounced by Castoriadis and that of the individual whose 
divergent path is recommended instead – Slavoj Žižek. In moving forward, hand-holds 
are thus more easily sought for along the way than might otherwise be expected. 
To summarise in opening, the problem within Castoriadis’s perspective of subjectivity is 
his contradictory notion of the psyche as a pre-social matrix-of-meaning which acts as 
both a lost and continuing point of reference within the socialised subject. Castoriadis’s 
adoption of this perspective arises in part from a rejection of the notion of alienation as 
a metaphysically given aspect of subjectivity, viewing it instead as derived from present 
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heteronomous social relations and as such to be overcome in his desired ‘autonomous 
society’. Through an engagement with Žižek’s theory of subjectivity this article, in 
contrast, argues for the reverse: autonomy of the kind Castoriadis desired, it seeks to 
show, necessitates embracing alienation as a fundamentally constitutive part of 
subjectivity. The end result is that, by re-reading Castoriadis’s conceptualisations of the 
subject and autonomy through Žižek’s own conceptions, this article overcomes the 
contradiction previously inherent to his conception of the subject whilst maintaining a 
concept of autonomous social change far greater than Žižek’s own inactive 
interpretation of ‘the Act’.  
Article Content and Structure 
A very respectable literature now exists discussing the works of both Castoriadis 
(Adams, 2011; Kioupkiolis, 2012; Klooger, 2009; Uribarri, 1992; Whitebook, 1998) and 
Žižek (Kay, 2003; Parker, 2004; Sharpe & Boucher, 2010; Sheehan, 2012; Vighi, 2010) 
with regards to the subject.1 This article pays close attention to two authors in 
particular. Specifically, it follows in the wake of Yannis Stavrakakis’s critique of 
Castoriadis in The Lacanian Left (2007) and Adrian Johnston’s explication of Žižek’s 
‘transcendental materialist theory of subjectivity’ (2007). Naturally, these authors’ 
works subsequently provide valuable points of reference with regards to both 
Castoriadis and Žižek’s theories for those seeking further insight into the argument set 
out here. Nevertheless, rather than rely heavily upon the reader’s own appraisal of 
these texts – as well as the primary literature – it is important that some time is still 
spent elucidating the core conceptual mechanics behind both thinker’s respective 
positions.  
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This is due to the weight placed by each on theoretical consistency and ontological 
transparency. Castoriadis (2007, 185), for example, spoke angrily against ‘the collector’ 
and ‘the eclectic’, arguing that theorists ‘can’t elude the demand for coherence’ and 
‘cannot establish articulations between ... different spheres just any which way – 
supposing they do lend themselves to articulations.’ In this same vein, in describing 
himself as ‘an extreme Stalinist philosopher’, Žižek explains that: ‘it’s clear where I 
stand. I don’t believe in combining things … I believe in clear-cut positions.’ (quoted in 
Žižek and Daly, 2008, 45) 
Recognition of such shared antipathy for ‘combing things’, alongside a ‘demand for 
coherence’ and ‘clear-cut positions’, brings with it a particular responsibility that there 
be absolutely clarity that there is no ‘eclecticism’ in the essential theoretical revisions 
proposed herein – that it is clear where the author stands. In taking the space to 
explicate Castoriadis and Žižek’s perspectives, the aim is to satisfy such concerns by 
‘showing the workings’ underlying the article’s argument – following Žižek’s dictum that 
‘the only way to be honest and to expose yourself to criticism is to state clearly and 
dogmatically where you are. You must take the risk and have a position’ (Žižek and Daly, 
op cit.). 
With this in mind, the article’s argument is structured in four parts: First, it details 
Castoriadis’s theory of autonomy and the subject. Second, it identifies the key problem 
within this theory – specifically, the contradictions at the heart of the monadic psyche as 
pre-social foundation for autonomous creations. Third, in answer to this, it turns to the 
work of Žižek, setting out his own conceptualisations of the subject and indicating how 
it offers a means of overcoming the problem in Castoriadis’s work. Fourthly, it 
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demonstrates how such a solution provides a coherent conceptualisation of 
autonomous activity still greater than the Žižek-ian ‘Act’. 
 
i) Castoriadis: The Human Psyche and Creation 
Self-Creation and ‘the Autonomous Society’ 
Understanding Castoriadis’s conception of autonomy is helped via an understanding of 
his favoured social goal, ‘the Autonomous Society’. Castoriadis (2007, 49) defines the 
autonomous society as one ‘capable of explicitly, lucidly challenging its own 
institutions.’ This he differentiates from a ‘heteronomous society’, wherein members 
think and act ‘in ways imposed (overtly or subterraneously) by the institution or the 
social environment’ (ibid, 86). Hetronomous individuals, he holds, ‘only apparently use 
their own judgement, whereas in fact they apply social criteria when judging’ (ibid, 75). 
In opposition to this ‘[a]n autonomous person is someone who gives herself her own 
laws’, an act (autos-nomos) which is achieved, Castoriadis argues, through the activity of 
self-reflexion; the individual ‘look[ing] inward, wondering about its motives, its reasons 
for acting, its profound inclinations’ (ibid, 89).  
This, Castoradis (ibid) notes, is ‘immensely difficult’, however people have a capacity for  
autonomy in this manner because, though inseparable from the external institution, 
they retain the ability to take ‘a reflexive, critical, deliberative’ relation to this ‘contents 
… from outside’ and thus ‘can to a significant degree say yes and no.’ (Castoriadis, 1996, 
12-3) It is this capacity which makes possible the institution2 of an autonomous society: 
‘The self-reflexive activity of an autonomous society is essentially dependent on the self-
reflexive activity of its members’ (Castoriadis, 2007, 90), the former thus being ‘a 
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society in which collective reflectiveness has reached its maximum’ (Castoriadis, 1997, 
194).  
In this manner, Castoriadis places the power to enact radical change firmly within the 
hands of autonomous agents. Indeed, Castoriadis contends that this autonomous 
creative ability should ‘be understood in the strongest sense possible’, as being able to 
enact ‘the emergence of forms which are in no sense or manner determined by what 
preceded them ... therefore involv[ing] the emergence/positing of the genuinely new’ 
(Klooger, 2009, 5). Autonomous creation, for Castoriadis (2007, 73), ‘is ontological 
creation: of forms such as language, institution qua institution, music, and painting; or 
of some specific form, some work of art, be it musical pictorial, poetic, or other’. 
For Castoriadis, however, this capacity for self-reflexivity in regards to the ‘outside’ and 
thus autonomy is based upon a particular conception of the subject and subjectivity 
which, as detailed below, suffers from an internal contradiction. To appreciate the 
dangers this brings for Castoriadis’s conception of autonomy – and subsequent 
explanation of an alternative – it is necessary to first understand this conception and 
contradiction. 
Psychic Monad qua Radical Imagination 
Castoriadis starts from the argument that people can exist only within and through 
society, but that there are aspects in the individual human being which are ‘not social’ 
(Castoriadis, 2010, 45). These he identifies as, first, the ‘biological substratum, the 
animal being’ – i.e. the corporeal bodily grund from which come affective somatic needs 
– and second ‘the psyche, that obscure, unfathomable, essentially a-social core’ which is 
‘infinitely more important’ than the biological substratum, though the latter is not non-
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affective (Castoriadis, 2007, 184). In other words, for Castoriadis the social does not 
reach all the way down into the psyche, which ‘cannot be reduced to society, just as 
society cannot be reduced to the psyche’ (ibid; see also Adams, 2011, 86). 
So conceived, the psyche, or ‘radical imagination’, is an unconscious ‘magma’ – molten, 
protean, shifting and unpredictable – which is also creative, being ‘the source of a 
perpetual flow of representations that are not prompted by ordinary logic’ (Castoriadis, 
2010, 45). It is this ‘primal unconscious’ within which representations originate: ‘it is 
Bildung and Einbildung – formation and imagination – it is the radical imagination that 
makes a ‘first’ representation arise out of a nothingness of representation, that is to say, 
out of nothing’ (Castoriadis, 2005, 283). The psyche is thus itself ‘the capacity to produce 
an ‘initial’ representation – the capacity of putting into image or making an image’ (ibid, 
282) – and as such provides the basis/capacity for creation ex nihlo fundamental to 
Castoriadis’s conception of the autonomous subject outlined above. But from where 
does this capacity, as an inherent property of the psyche, derive? 
The Originary Monadic Psyche  
Castoriadis premises his conception of the radical psyche upon a psychical shift in the 
form of a break between an ‘originary being of psyche’ or ‘original monadic state’ 
belonging to the infans and a ‘developed’ subjectivity which follows resultantly from 
said break (Castoriadis, 2007, 154). The former original monadic state is a closed, 
‘unitary’ totality (Castoriadis, 2005, 293). All meaning is experienced in an unmediated 
manner, it being ‘at one and the same time self, proto-subject and proto-world, as they 
mutually and fully over lap’ (ibid, 291).  
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The unavoidable, violent breaking of this original monadic state is explained by 
Castoriadis (2007, 155-7) through a basic Freudian metaphor: ‘the absence of the 
breast’, he writes, ‘amounts to a destruction of the closed totality of the infans, whence 
the collapse of meaning of its world’, leaving ‘a gaping hole in its world’. Put simply, 
socialisation – in the form of the infans’ necessary dependence upon others and the 
resultant presence of the Other in human form (in particular the family) – leads to the 
rupturing of the self-enclosed psychic monad.  
The consequence of this evental episode is a subsequently wrought, divided subject, 
with the resultant development of ‘the I’ qua ego via the ‘cathecting’ of the existing 
societal institution as suture for the ‘absence of meaning’ which constitutes the 
aforementioned ‘gaping hole’ of lost-meaning. The development of the ego is thus 
essentially a social construct whereby, after the fracturing of the monadic psyche, 
socialisation ‘leans on ... the psychical need for meaning’ (ibid), specifically the 
impossible search for a return to the inaccessible, pre-socialised, pre-break monadic 
state of meaning with its ‘absolute congruence between intention, representation and 
affect’ (Castoriadis, 2005, 296). 
An ‘original capacity’ for creativity 
With regards to (wo)man’s capacity for autonomous creativity, Castoriadis draws an 
important retroactive conclusion from the above by declaring that the possibility of 
such a destruction of this closed psychic totality and resultant formation of the ego is 
itself only a possibility if the monadic psyche constitutively amounts to ‘the first matrix 
of meaning’ (Castoriadis, 2005, 299) – i.e. an ‘original capacity’ which ‘contains within 
itself the possibility of organizing all representations’ – thereby containing a 
constitutive pre-social ‘proto-meaning’ that ‘realizes by itself, just where meaning 
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cannot yet exist, total meaning...’ (ibid, 299). This is due to the fact that, according to 
Castoriadis, such a ‘memory of monadic memory’ must exist to make socialisation (i.e. 
the cathecting of social-meaning) possible at all (Castoriadis, 1984a, 25). The capacity 
for self-alteration is thus a constitutive part of the psyche, with people’s potential for 
autonomy – as the capacity to create ex nihlo – devolving from this entity. 
As Whitebook (1998, 178) describes, Castoriadis thus finds himself committed ‘to the 
monadic starting point as pre-social meaning, which he apparently feels he has to 
defend in a radical form in order to defend, in turn, the autonomy and creativity of the 
radical imagination.’ This is because, as Yannis Stavrakakis (2007, 55) quoting 
Whitebook explains, this ‘mode of originary being of the psyche’ and resulting 
continuation of a ‘first-pseudo meaning’ provides a ‘supplement’ which acts as a pre-
socially-derived a-social basis for reflection ‘at a distance’ post-socialisation – the 
necessary ability, as discussed, for Castoriadis’s radical conception of autonomy qua 
self-creation. Thus, the ‘ego of autonomy’, as Castoriadis (2010, 42) describes it, ‘is not 
the absolute Self’, but ‘the monad cleaning and polishing its external-internal surface in 
order to eliminate the impurities resulting from contact with others’: In other words, no 
monad, no autonomy. 
 
ii) The Problem: In Defence of Alienation 
Castoriadis’s rationale for this particular a-social end-point has already been explained 
with regards to his theory of the subject. Yet a normative reasoning is also clearly 
present, tied to his embracing of autonomy as social value and aim: his desire to avoid 
acknowledging alienation as constitutive of subjectivity. This desire explains, in part, his 
visceral rejection of the writings of Jacques Lacan (see: Castoriadis, 1984b, 49). There 
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were, admittedly, a number of reasons for this rejection (cf. Dews, 2002), but a key 
element appears to be a problem with Lacan’s ‘basic move’, in Žižek’s words, ‘to elevate 
psychoanalysis to the level of philosophy’ such that ‘apparently clinical categories … are 
not just subjective pathologies’ but rather ‘disturbances in the basic ontological 
relationship between the subject and the world’ (Žižek quoted in Hauser, 2009, 1).  
In this sense, what Castoriadis arguably feared in Lacan was a theoretical fetishism of 
the ‘the gap/lack’ – the aforementioned ‘absence of meaning’ – such that ‘alienation’ is 
built into the very definition of the subject and social (Tormey and Townshend, 2006, 
23). Castoriadis rejected this, viewing alienation instead as something to be overcome in 
the autonomous society: ‘The revolutionary project’, as he put it, is ‘the historical aim of 
a society that would have gone beyond alienation’, the latter being ‘a social-historical 
fact (instituted heteronomy), not a metaphysical given’ (Castoriadis, 1997, 29). 
Grounding the radical imagination upon the continuation of a pre-social meaning made 
it possible, so Castoriadis believed, that we could ‘overcome the alienation of ourselves 
from the world’ (Tormey and Townshend, 2006, 27). It was in this light that Lyotard 
(1993, 116), who broke with Castoriadis in 1964, wrote of his former comrade as being 
‘rightly bored with reassessing historical, dialectic and diarrhoetic materialism’ but as 
nevertheless proposing ‘to put in its place the abominable super-male thing of 
generalised creativity ... against alienation’. 
What Castoriadis’s feared within Lacan’s model of subjectivity, was that his notion that 
the subject was born into language meant the latter preceded the former, alienating it, 
and thus determined (in the strong sense of the term) their shaping and creation. Žižek 
(2006, 8) caricatures this general interpretation as meaning that, from Castoriadis’s 
‘simplified’ perspective:  
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... for Lacan, we human individuals are mere epiphenomena, shadows with no real power 
of our own, that our self-perception as autonomous free agents is a kind of user’s illusion 
blinding us to the fact that we are tools in the hands of the big Other [the symbolic order, 
society’s unwritten constitution] that hides behind the screen and pulls the strings. 
It was in defiance of such a perceived view that Castoriadis theorised the afore-given 
model of subjectivity – seeking to reconfigure the psyche so as to prevent the 
unconscious becoming ‘hostage to conservative forces’ (as he viewed it in Lacan) by 
remodelling it as ‘a source of radical energies as opposed to a source of inertia and 
social conservatism’ (Tormey & Townshend, 2006, 22). For him, the psyche was 
‘radically different from language as representations appear neither distinct nor 
definite’ (Adams, 2011, 87). 
As Stavrakakis (2007) details, however, the problem with this model of subjectivity is 
that it is based upon a crucial continuation between the two separated moments of the 
‘inside’ – the subjective state of the infans and of the socialised subject – whereby, rather 
than these two states being incommensurable, the gap between them is to all extents 
and purposes annulled via a continuity of ‘meaning’. Although with the ‘break’ 
socialisation replaces the original monadic meaning with social meanings, ultimately it 
cannot be eliminated – it is never fully abandoned or repressed. As such it is based upon 
the contradictory and essentialist notion of the original monadic matrix-of-meaning as 
both a lost and continuing point of reference. Indeed, it must on principle be so if it is to 
function as a ‘meaning-prototype’ for such a socially distanced creative ability (ibid, 56).  
It is understandable, therefore, that Tormey and Townshend (2006, 28) caution that ‘it 
is perhaps worth pausing ... to gauge the degree to which such an account represents an 
advance on those [e.g. Lacan’s] it seeks to displace’ as this appears, at first sight, a 
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fundamental flaw within Castoriadis’s theory of subjectivity. Nevertheless, though faced 
with this serious contradiction, Castoriadis’s work should not be rejected in toto, 
thereby surrendering not only his insights into subjectivity but, resultantly, his valuable 
conception of autonomy also. Instead, the fault within his theory – the monadic psyche 
in the form explicated above – can and should be fixed. Doing so, however, necessitates 
a retreat from Castoriadis’s ‘advance’, to a purely imagined place situated before 
Castoriadis’s stark rejection of Lacan – arguing that this schism was unnecessary in the 
first place – before subsequently starting forward again in a changed direction.  
Stavrakakis (2007, 58-9) describes Castoriadis as ‘obviously afraid that registering the 
irreducible force of alienation, antagonism and dislocation, can endanger the prospects 
of radical change – of imagining a better future – and discourage political participation’, 
noting that ‘Lacanian theory does not share this fear.’ This ‘fearless’ position is broadly 
advocated here also. Castoraidis’s antagonistic critique was entirely too negative, being 
mistaken in its construal of the Lacanian perspective as an ultimately closed and thus 
determined structuralist one. Or, more accurately, this is the case as regards the version 
of Lacan offered in what Adrian Johnston (2007) labels Slavoj Žižek’s ‘transendental 
materialist’ ontology of subjectivity.  
This ontology lies at ‘the very core’ of Žižek’s thinking (see Hauser, 2009, 2); as he 
himself has declared:  
If you were to ask me at gunpoint ... to demand, “Three sentences. What are you really 
trying to do?” I would say, Screw ideology. Screw movie analysis. What really interests me 
is the following insight: if you look at the very core of psychoanalytic theory, of which 
even Freud was not aware, it’s properly read death drive ... the only way to read this 
properly is to read it against the background of the notion of subjectivity as self-relating 
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negativity in German Idealism. That is to say, I take literally Lacan’s indication that the 
subject of psychoanalysis is the Cartesian cogito – of course, I would add, as reread by 
Kant, Schelling, and Hegel. I am here very old fashioned. I still think basically this ... is 
philosophy, and all the rest is a footnote. (Žižek, 2003) 
This theoretical project constitutes the homogenous core from which Žižek’s 
heterogeneous style normally distracts (Eagleton, 2001, 40, 49). It is to this that 
attention is now directed in the belief that Žižek’s theory of the subject opens a better 
route for advancement. This is because it offers an alternative, yet familial model of the 
psyche upon which to ‘ground’ Castoriadis’s radical conceptualisation of autonomous 
creativity which does not suffer from the contradiction at the heart of his own theory. 
What this re-reading of Castoriadis via Žižek involves, however, is a rather violent 
theoretical act: the monad must be excised, leaving in its stead the very thing 
Castoriadis believed must be overcome if true autonomy was to be achieved – the 
recognition of alienation as a constitutive aspect of subjectivity. The following section 
explains how such a procedure is possible, an undertaking which, as was the case with 
Castoriadis, means first detailing Žižek’s own Lacanian derived theory of subjectivity, 
pace the former’s.  
iii) Žižek: a ‘Transendental Materialist Subjectivity’ 
Cartesian Similarities and the ‘Broken’ Psyche 
With regards to subjectivity, Žižek and Castoriadis share many points in common, 
including a significant joint opposition to the intellectual trend to absorb the subject 
into the intersubjective; both maintain an attachment to the Cartesian cogito as concept. 
For Castoriadis, an essential moment of Cartesianism is preserved in the 
aforementioned unitary psychic monad. In The Ticklish Subject meanwhile, Žižek (2000, 
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1) sought to counteract the intellectual exorcists who sought to dissipate the ‘spectre ... 
haunting western academia ... the spectre of the Cartesian subject’. 
Being both based within psychoanalytical theory (see: Fricker, 2007, 38), a key 
similarity is further obvious in the foundational role each prescribes to an unavoidable 
psychic ‘break’ as the well-spring of developed, post-infans subjectivity. Johnston (2007, 
xxiii) – whose work is drawn upon extensively herein – describes in detail and with 
clarity how in Žižek’s theorisation, ‘transcendental, cogito-like subjectivity emerges’ – 
indeed is propelled – ‘ontogenetically’ from ‘an originally corporeal condition as its 
anterior ground’. As with Castoriadis’s conception (see above), this material grund, 
rather than being internally harmonized, is from the very beginning ‘hard-wired for a 
certain dsyfunctionality’, being ‘shot through with various antagonisms, conflicts, and 
tensions’ (ibid). 
It is here where differences start to appear. In Castoriadis’s conception the monadic 
psyche is a positive state separate from the social – somatic and social ‘shocks’ being 
mediated through an original, essentialist meaning which exists pre-socialisation. This 
perspective differs from Žižek’s wherein the infans is in a pre-symbolic real state  - ‘both 
the real of the subject and the real he has to deal with as exterior’ (Lacan, 1992, 118). 
The ‘Real’, in Lacan, is the unfathomable limit which cannot be objectified as it is that 
point in regards to which there is no ‘meta-language’ (Žižek, 1994,b 22); it ‘is not an 
external thing that resists being caught in the symbolic network, but the fissure within 
the symbolic network itself’ (Žižek, 2006, 72). As such this ‘subject-in-the-real’ contains 
no pre-social, positive ‘meaning’ to mediate somatic and social stimuli.  
Back on shared ground, however, through the socio-symbolic intrusion of the ‘Big 
Other’3 (specifically family) a moment of ‘imagining’ is brought about whereby the 
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infant is guided to recognise itself in its own reflected image. In Lacanese, this is 
referred to as the ‘Mirror-stage’ (see: Žižek, 1998a, 271) and herein, through the 
embrace of the (symbolic) imago the enclosed intra-psychical imaginary is 
thrust/propelled into socio-symbolic subjectivity in a ‘choice’  forced – as per 
Castoriadis’s conceptualisation with ‘the absence of the breast’ – by the ‘ontogenetic 
catalyst’ of the short-circuiting failure of the aforementioned volatile, primordial 
material grund. In this moment a ‘crack’ is brought about between the organism (corpo-
real) and its image (symbolic) which are thereon negatively related via a tensional 
opposition. Once again, it is a model based around a wrought, divided subject. 
The Subject as Void 
Contra Castoriadis, however, for Žižek, the unconscious is not a monad, but this very 
‘crack’, the void of radical negativity, of nothingness – a dynamic absence/lack ‘forever 
irreducible to any and every instance of determinate phenomenal actualization’ 
(Johnston, 2007, 12). Like an onion, peeling away the layers of the ego leads one not to a 
hardened core (e.g. a positive psychic monad) but to nothing – an ‘empty spot’ (ibid, 9). 
To quote Žižek (1994a, 144): 
Lacan’s point here is that an unsurmountable gap forever separates what I am “in the 
real” from the symbolic mandate that procures my social identity: the primordial 
ontological fact is the void, the abyss on account of which I am inaccessible to myself in 
my capacity as a real substance... Every symbolic identity I acquire is ultimately nothing 
but a supplementary feature whose function is to fill out this void. This pure void of 
subjectivity, this empty form of “transcendental apperception,” has to be distinguished 
from the Cartesian Cogito which remains res cogitans, a little piece of substantial reality 
miraculously saved from the destructive force of universal doubt... 
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This leads to what Žižek (1990, 252-4) refers to as the ‘barred-subject’3 wherein self 
/ego/imaginary and subject/id/void are construed as opposing poles; this is a ‘split 
subject’ which ‘can never fully ‘become himself’ ... can never fully realize himself’ (Žižek, 
1992, 181). 
The transcendental ego (self) is the symbolic ‘I’ (the imago) filled by the imaginary 
fantasies to suture the void which – being an impediment to the attainment of placid, 
closed, unsullied self-consciousness – in a paradoxical logic, generates that which it 
impedes. This is because ‘the repeated attempts by reflective activity to “catch its own 
tail” generate a by-product, namely, fantasies as responses to this irreducible self-
opacity’ (ibid, 32) and these supplementary fantasies ‘filling out the void’ constitute the 
ego. In this re-formulated regard, as Žižek (1993, 64) puts it:  ‘Cogito designates this 
very point at which the “I” loses its support in the symbolic network ... and thus, in a 
sense which is far from metaphorical, ceases to exist’ (Perhaps, the phrase might be 
reworked then to read “I cannot think it, therefore I am”). Subjectivity is thus a 
symptom of this unconscious psyche qua void, being ultimately ‘the permanent tension 
between the phenomenal, experientially constituted ego and the quasi-noumenal, 
unrepresentable manque-á-être (lack-of-being) in relation to which every determinate 
identity-construct is a defensive, fantasmatic response.’ (Johnston, 2007, 9) 
Same Same, but Different: misreading Castoriadis through Žižek 
Explicated in this manner, the similarities between Castoriadis and Žižek’s theories of 
subjectivity are easy to see. Both theorise the existence of a pre-developed, ‘totalised’ 
infans psyche wherein meaning is experienced immediately and there is no experienced 
differentiation between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. Both theorise the occurrence of a ‘break’, 
onto-genetic in nature, whereby the totalised psyche is thrust into socio-symbolic 
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reality, splitting/rupturing it; and both view the self as a symptom of this break, with 
the development of the transcendental ego being a social-cathection to suture this break 
within ‘complete’ subjectivity. Both also argue that this break creates an ‘internal’ 
psychic drive for fulfilment, buffeting and affecting the ego – itself also affected 
‘externally’ by the symbolic-imaginary of the social-historical order / the ‘big Other’ – 
and that it is from this which a capacity for creativity derives. 
The key difference between Castoriadis and Žižek, as pertains to subjectivity therefore 
comes down to the difference between what is ultimately an essentially positive 
conception of the unconscious and an irreducibly negative one (on this, see: Adams, 
2011, 90). Thus, while for Castoriadis at the infans stage the monadic psyche is a 
positive state separate from the social, this is not the case with Žižek’s own 
conceptualisation of the ‘subject-in-the-real’. The first holds to the existence of a pre-
social matrix-of-meaning through which somatic and social stimuli are mediated, the 
latter does not. Furthermore, in Žižek’s conceptualisation there is a radical distance 
between the pre-symbolic and post-symbolic state of subjectivity following the break. 
Rather than a positive ‘memory’ remaining from the pre-socialised state there is only 
the radical negativity of the void. For Castoriadis, meanwhile, there is a simultaneous – 
and contradictory – continuation and loss of pre-social meaning between these two 
subjective states. 
Read alongside one another the similarities between the two approaches are thus as 
impressive as the fundamental differences. Indeed it seems a shame that, for two figures 
who share so much in common, their relation should be blighted by these apparent 
incommensurables. In light of this, as discussed above, what is here advocated is a 
deliberate misreading of Castoriadis through Žižek framed spectacles – one which 
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visualises the surgical excision of the notion of an essential pre-social monadic meaning 
(and its resultant, post-break continuation) and leaves only a Žižek-ian subject qua void 
of self-relating negativity. With the importance for both Castoriadis and Žižek of 
coherence and clear-cut positions, such an action must amount to more than a mere 
combination of parts. The question, then, is the extent to which this re-reading of 
Castoriadis as regards subjectivity undermines/alters the philosophy of radical 
autonomy he offers us also? Does re-reading Castoriadis through Žižek leave us, 
ultimately, with just Žižek? The argument set out below, is resolutely No. 
Castoriadis’s conception of the unconsciousness as ‘magmatic’ (Castoriadis, 2005, 283) 
is valuable here. ‘A magma’, as he defines it, constitutes ‘that from which one can extract 
(or in which one can construct) an indefinite number of ensemblist [set-theoretical] 
organizations but which can never be reconstituted (ideally) by a (finite or infinite) 
ensemblist composition of these organizations’ (ibid, 343). Being un-signifiable (i.e. 
unable to be reconstituted) and unstable, this notion of the psyche as magmatic 
conception might be directly compared to the un-closable and fluctuating, alienating, 
negative gap/lack/void constitutive of Lacanian subjectivity (and indeed all social-
structures). 
Thus, to pull an admittedly out of context quotation from Castoriadis, viewing the 
magmatic unconscious as this alienating but generative psychic entity allows theorists 
to embrace a view wherein, pace the monad as foundation of creativity: ‘The 
chaos/abyss/bottomlessness is what is behind or under every concrete existence, and 
at the same time it is the creative force – what we would call the vis formandi in Latin – 
that causes that upsurge of forms, organized being.’ (Castoriadis, 2007, 171) What is 
this but the equivalent of the Lacanian ‘Real’ as described above? Indeed, Castoriadis 
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talks of the ‘ultimately undescribable X “out there”’ (1997, 327) and the ‘a-meaning of 
the world [which] is always a threat for the meaning of society. Thus the ever-present 
risk that the social edifice of significations will totter.’ (1991, 152) As these quotations 
attest, Castoriadis appears to accept the schema of a gap between what Lacanians would 
call the Real and the Imaginary-Symbolic ‘externally’, he simply does not do so 
internally: therein, by contrast, is the monad as homogenous, fluctuating field of 
‘representations cum affects cum intentions’ (Castoriadis, 1997, 327).  
Here then, is this article’s key theoretical manoeuvre with regards to subjectivity: By 
fraternally choosing to misread Castoriadis’s notion of the magmatic unconscious as 
signifying the unsignifiable void as per the manner set-out in Žižek’s theory of the 
subject, it becomes possible to apply the former’s already existing conception of the 
outside inside also, overcoming the contradictions internal to his conception of 
subjectivity and in so doing providing a radically negative foundation for contingent 
positive creation (cf. Marchart, 2007). 
iv) Autonomy and ‘the Act’ 
So, does the excision of the monad eradicate the possibility of a genuinely radical 
conceptualisation of autonomy? As described already, Castoriadis (2007, 89) 
conceptualised the autonomous person as ‘someone who gives herself her own laws’, 
this being possible via individual’s capacity to ‘look inward, wondering about its 
motives, its reasons for acting, its profound inclinations’. He thus placed creative power 
firmly within the hands of autonomous agents. How does this compare with Žižek’s 
conception of the transformatory subject?  
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The first point to grasp is that, in opposition to Castoriadis’ conception of Lacan as an 
arch-structuralist, the latter never denied the possibility of a radical re-articulation of 
the predominant symbolic order. This ability to re-articulate does not, however, contra 
Castoriadis’ view, spring from, nor is it guaranteed by, any ‘primordial essence or source 
of representation’ (Stavrakakis, 2007, 59). Rather, this re-articulation becomes possible 
within the gap created by the contingent dislocation of the existing socio-symbolic 
order.  
It is from this point that Žižek adopts what has been labelled a ‘Leninist-Lacanian’ 
conception of the Act (l’acte) supported by an optimistic faith that presently perceived 
limits on the possible don’t signal an unescapable enclosure (Žižek & Daly, 2004, 135). 
This is due to the fact that the internal order of the mediating imaginary-symbolic order 
within which actors operate cannot be closed/determined by a privileged centre; 
rather, it contains ineliminable loop-holes and points of potential dysfunctional 
breakdown (Johnston, 2007, 236). This is the case since, were the latter not the case, it 
would logically involve the inherently contradictory situation whereby a centre 
structured the structure whilst itself escaping the process of structuration (cf. Derrida, 
1978, 279). This absence of an a priori or final (i.e. ultimate) foundation, means that 
complete totalisation and the closure of  any/all systems or structures of social relations 
is ultimately impossible, there being within them a ‘dissynchrony that is fundamental to 
our language, [and] our selves’ (Widder, 2008, 10). 
Within the contours of these ‘un-fixable’ social-historical constructions, the Žižek-ian 
Act designates those ‘occurrences and gestures through which old orders are broken 
with via points of abrupt rupture, points interrupting the cohesion and continuity of 
whatever counts as the established run of things’; they are ‘that which, from apparently 
21 
 
out of nowhere, suddenly and unexpectedly catalyzes processes of transformation 
within given sets of circumstances’ (Johnston, 2009, xx, xxviii). The Act is autonomous 
in character in so far as it occurs following a ‘break’ in a previously sedimented 
imaginary-symbolic order and as such is not constrained by the pre-existing social 
structure; it ‘is, as it were, an abyssal self-grounded autonomous act’ (Žižek & Daly, 
2004, 136). 
The Act is thus truly radical in the sense that the term indicates ‘an unbridgeable gap 
between two levels which cannot be mediated or dialecticized via the logic of either 
level’ (Marchart, 2004, 58); the ‘value’ of an Act cannot be determined on the basis of 
what came before it, constituting ‘an intervention that cannot be accounted for in terms 
of its pre-existing ‘objective conditions’.’ (Žižek, 2001a, 117) Rather, the ‘true’ Act, Žižek 
states (2009, 151-2), ‘fills in the gap in our knowledge’. Importantly, Žižek refuses to 
specify any possible preconditions for the occurrence of the conditions of an Act, their 
being conceived instead as arising ex nihlo: ‘We cannot actively decide to accomplish an 
act, the act surprises the agent itself’ (Žižek, 2001b, 144). 
Such ex nihlo creation involves radical transformation both for the symbolic order and 
for subjectivity itself whilst not implying any association with the remnants of a 
presupposed proto-meaning. But it also means accepting a concept of social change 
seemingly predicated upon surprise encounters and a radically indeterminable process 
of post-break societal re-sedimentation: The Act itself does not actively cause the 
dislocation; rather the ‘political revolution’, so understood, is a ‘miracle’ (Žižek, 2001c, 
15). But such a view is as Johnston (2009, xxx) writes, both ‘questionable and 
problematic’, dismissing as it does ‘gradual evolution’ as involving no change at all (and 
certainly no agency), plumping instead, in its dismissal of ‘ostensibly minor actions’, for 
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a conception of political transformation based upon individuals ‘awaiting the 
miraculous event of the major act’ (ibid) – which they themselves will not know how 
they brought about (Žižek, 1998b, 14). 
In a sense this is to conceptualise subjects as actors (or more accurately ‘actors’) who do 
not act, as the Žižek-ian Act thus all but forecloses discussion of real political action both 
before and after the Act: Like Castoriadis, the aim of Žižek, to quote Sharpe and Boucher 
(2010, 63), is ‘overcoming heteronomy’, but ‘the way [he] understands the Cartesian 
subject [as void] frames what [he] can think is politically desirable, and informs his view 
concerning the possible ways these political ideals can be achieved’ (ibid, 64).  As 
Swedlow (2010, 172) asks, ‘if an act is something that occurs to the subject, to what 
degree is it an act and not an effect?’- a question he answers by declaring Žižek’s 
concept of the Act a case of ‘confusion between formal description and prescription’. His 
is, as such, an exogenously derived, asymmetrically re-active conception of political 
transformation: radical change occurs with the unforeseeable encounter with the 
inexplicable (i.e. the Real) and thus lacks a pro-active, endogenous element. This is a 
conceptualisation which ironically brings with it the coterminous risk of discouraging in 
advance exactly the sort of efforts to transform the present world as Žižek seemingly 
desires (see: Sheehan, 2012, 85). It also seems as far away from the autonomous subject 
dreamt of by Castoriadis as it is possible to be. 
Yet, the similarities between Castoriadis and Žižek do not end with regards to 
subjectivity as, in what might appear a further irony, Castoriadis himself raises a similar 
thesis regarding forms of radical change. As he declares, in words which might have 
been copy/pasted from Žižek himself: 
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if we want to move on to something different, for me, this is what strikes me as a problem 
(and here we are facing the abyss): basically, what does this require? It requires a new 
historical creation with new significations, new values, a new type of human being, all of 
which has, more or less, to be done at the same time, transcending, by definition, all 
possibility of foresight and of forward planning. (Castoriadis, 2011, 37) 
There are clear harmonics between this notion – of new creation transcending all 
possibility of planning – and Žižek’s conception of the Act. In these manners, Alexandros 
Kioukiolos (2012, 141) notes, both Castoriadis ‘and more uncritically Žižek’ hold ‘onto 
the prospect of large-scale socially reconstruction, which might be fundamental but 
could not be total or final.’  
Despite such moments of seeming synchronicity, however, the two conceptions of 
autonomy are not the same. Castoriadis’s conceptualisation of autonomous activity still 
provides a valuable theoretical counter-point to the ‘wait and see’ position fundamental 
to ‘the Act’ due to its emphasis on action as much as autonomy. While Žižek’s conception 
of the (im)possibility of autonomous agency leads him to argue that ‘[t]he only way to 
lay the foundations for a true, radical change is to withdraw from the compulsion to act, 
to ‘do nothing’…’ (Žižek, 2004, 72), Castoriadis declares that ‘Freedom is activity’: 
Freedom is very difficult. […] There’s a marvellous phrase from Thucydides: “it is 
necessary to choose: rest or be free.” I think it’s Pericles who says this to the Athenians: “if 
you want to be free, you have to work.” You cannot rest. (2011, 17) 
This is a classic agonisitic view of political action. The key question then is whether, 
with the corrective theoretical surgery advocated above to excise the problematic 
concept of the monad as vessel of an originary matrix of meaning, the basis for this 
constructive concept of autonomy as activity is removed also? Rather than a cure, do we 
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end up with a lobotomised Castoriadis, leaving us nothing, in terms of political action, 
but the also problematic notion of the Act as ‘miraculous event’ as per Žižek (2000, 
376)? Again, the answer is No. 
Alienation and Autonomy: Prerequisite, not Obstacle 
The key issue here is the psyche. For Castoriadis autonomy is predicated upon an ability 
to think ‘at a distance’ from the social-historical and this is made possible by the extra-
social matrix of meaning which exists in the monadic psyche, continuing across from the 
pre-socialised monadic state of the infans. On the other hand, autonomy in the Žižek-ian 
sense is made possible for exactly the opposite reason: It is the lack of any such monadic 
psyche which keeps open the possibility of traversing present sedimented modes of 
thinking. This is because the psyche, as lack, acts as ‘a hitch’ – that  is, as ‘an impediment 
which gives rise to ever-new symbolizations by means of which one endeavours to 
integrate and domesticate it ... but which simultaneously condemns these endeavours to 
ultimate failure’ (Žižek, 1994b, 22). 
Indeed, to borrow a phrase from Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 8), the autonomous 
individual, it might be said, works (i.e. acts in a manner which can be deemed 
autonomous) ‘only when they break down, and by continually breaking down’. This is 
meant not in the Deleuzian sense – i.e. of a shattering, fragmenting or disintegrating 
subject – but instead as something akin to an irreparable perpetual-motion machine 
which, continual glitching and occasionally crashing, always subsequently re-boots with 
a modified programming: There is a ‘ghost’ in this machine, but this ghost is not the 
‘mind’ as distinct from the ‘matter’ as understood in the normal Cartesian sense, but the 
catalytic tension created by the ineliminable ‘gap’ constitutive of subjectivity, be it 
25 
 
labelled ‘magma’ (following Castoriadis) or ‘lack’ (following Žižek). It is here that we 
find the space for a form of agential autonomy worthy of the name. 
As Fabio Vighi (2010, 133) writes in his own re-working of Žižek’s philosophy: ‘Žižek’s 
materialism is based on the groundbreaking insight that the gap constitutive of reality is 
nothing but the gap constitutive of subjectivity: we are the very impossibility that we 
ascribe to external reality, and that we must constantly disavow or displace if we are to 
connect with it.’ It is for this reason that ‘[i]t is therefore crucial, politically, to conceive 
self-alienation not as a problem but as the key to the solution’ (ibid, 101). In seeking 
answers regarding the possibility of autonomy, the focus must therefore be upon the 
occurrence of this ‘short-circuiting’ (Johnston, 2007, xxiii) qua displacement from 
external reality, how it comes about and the possibilities for pro-active, positive agency 
attached to it. 
Since Žižek’s position is that this short-circuiting occurs by surprise, without agential 
intension (2000, 376), the notion of seeking out encounters with such a resultant effect 
might seem too self-authorial and thus quasi-existentialist from his perspective. Yet 
arguably active critical reflexivity allows exactly such an act(ion), even with the excision 
of the positively-charged psychic monad. It is this ability which, as noted, for Castoriadis 
underlies subjects’ capacity for autonomy – his ‘project of autonomy’ envisaging ‘the 
maximization of the possibilities of reflection, self-reflection and deliberation’ (Peter 
Osborne quoted in Castoriadis, 1996, 13). As Sharpe and Bouchner note, in his early 
works Žižek (1989-c.1995) arguably shared such a view: ‘the political ideal that 
animates [this] work is the modern notion of autonomy: rational self-determination by 
self-legislating individuals, in opposition to our dependent, heteronomous subjection to 
the socio-political Other’ (2010, 63). This, however, was in his ‘radical democratic’ 
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phase, before and the embracing of the ‘Leninist-Lacanian’ Act as the only true path to 
change. 
In judging how this can be actualised we can return to Castoriadis, or at least one of his 
primary interpreters, David Ames Curtis and his delineation of the concept of 
improvisation. As Curtis (1988, xvii) describes, ‘[t]o “im-pro-vise” literally means not to 
“foresee,” not to anticipate’ (ibid, xvii). As a statement regarding action, this chimes in 
regards to the Act, as explained above. Discussing the concept via the metaphor of jazz 
improvisation, however, Curtis writes that: 
In “improvisation” as I conceive it, one does not act in an “immediate,” un-prepared way 
lacking all foresight ... The very process of “improvisation” ... involves planning, the 
making of choices (one of the most elementary being when to start “playing” and when to 
remain silent), and the creation of alternative forms of articulation (what to “play”); it also 
gives birth to that which was not contained in previous activities. (ibid, xix) 
Castoriadis (2010, 188) speaks of the need for an individual seeking ‘enlightenment’ to 
first ‘shake herself enough to be able to be enlightened’, the latter not being a passive 
state, but one sought: ‘You must want to be enlightened’ as ‘[t]he reception of the 
Enlightenment is just as creative as its creation.’  
Like a reader who selects a random article from Subjectivity on the judgement that its 
content may confront her with radical new ideas which are until the point of encounter 
unanticipated, individuals can elect to self-reflexively interrogate their own positions on 
different issues of their own determining in a manner whereby the end point reached is 
unknown. What do I believe? Why do I believe it? Upon what grounds have I made this 
judgement? All knowledge of the world being mediated through existing social-
historical imaginary-symbolic institutions, themselves held ‘open’ by the limits of the 
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Real, all judgements regarding these questions are made based upon contingently 
founded foundations and as such can become ‘unstuck' (see: Marchart, 2007). It is in 
looking at seemingly foundational statements awry that this lack of objective finality is 
evident.  
In all of this, self-reflexivity is key; however, pace Castoriadis, in said reflecting there is 
no pre-historic matrix of meaning to buttress and mould new ideas from. Rather, it is 
the alienation fundamental to subjectivity, barring the closure of individual identity, 
that makes possible subjective short-circuiting and thus keeps open spaces ‘at a 
distance’ from pre-existing systems of social significations wherein new patterns of 
symbolisation can arise. Peeling away justifications one arrives at the empty space of a 
pure “because”, thus dislocating the pre-existing imaginary-symbolic institution and 
opening up the space for another more ’readable’ (re)articulation. 
Castoriadis (2011, 38) himself compared this process to the autonomy of the poet, 
explaining that ‘[w]hen you write a poem, you use the words of the language, but what 
you are doing is not a combination of these words. It’s a new form that you impose on 
them, through their linkage, through a sense [esprit] that pervades a poem.’ This form of 
creation, he argues, ‘is not a simple reprisal of elements that were in existence’ as 
‘[t]here is a new form [created] that is not limited to combination.’ As Kioupkiolis (2012, 
188) echoes: ‘Original self-creation consists mainly in the sporadic emergence of new 
forms that cannot be fully reduced to antecedent conditions. But new figures make use 
of pre-existing materials and spring up within pre-established contexts.’ 
Such a conception of autonomous change viz. reflexive improvisation involves the re-
articulation of pre-existing elements of the social-historical, such that a fundamentally 
new form of imaginary-symbolic representation is created ex nihlo. It thus offers a pro-
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active conceptualisation of how radical agent-led change can occur which goes beyond, 
without rejecting, the Žižek-ian Act as (a) mode of autonomous revolution – but is not 
reliant upon Castoriadis’s problematic ontology of subjectivity based around concepts 
such as a monadic psyche containing a pre-social meaning which continues to exist 
post-socialisation. In an act of filtration, re-reading Castoriadis through Žižek as 
advocated here produces a new composite purer for being tainted. 
 
Conclusion  
Castoriadis wanted to overcome alienation, believing it a mere social-historical 
condition and ultimate impediment to autonomy. In so doing he crafted a theory of the 
subject which contained within it a fatal contradiction. Ironically, what he had failed to 
recognise is that it is precisely alienation which makes possible autonomy in the first 
place: A heteronomous element qua a blockage internal to subjectivity is always 
necessary for autonomous creativity, barring as it does the closure of subjective identity 
and social identifications and thus providing the conditions for ‘short-circuiting’ via 
improvisation which makes autonomous action possible. In other words, it is only the 
existence of an internal subjective heterogeneous element that wards against the 
inevitability of social heteronomy.  
In re-reading Castoriadis through Žižek as contentiously proposed here, the aim has 
been twofold: First, to show how the inherent contradictions of the former’s theory of 
the subject can be overcome by embracing the fundamental alienation central to the 
ontology of the latter; second, to demonstrate that in doing so, the pro-active 
conceptualisation of autonomous creativity ex nihlo which Castoriadis advocated 
remains in our grasp, not simply  Žižek’s rather disempowering concept of the Act. 
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Notes 
1 See also the special issue of Subjectivity, 10 (3) edited by Derek Hook and Calum Neill (2010).  
2 For Castoriadis, the term ‘institution’ – so important in his work – designates both ‘the instituting 
process ... and the concrete institutions of a given society all at one’. It can, therefore, be seen as being 
double-jointed in its meaning (Arnold, quoted in Castoriadis, 2007, 272). 
2 To further clarify, the ‘Big Other’ is a modality of ‘the Other’, the symbolic which blocks the closure of 
‘the Subject’ (hence, the Lacanese matheme of the barred S sign: $ for the ‘barred-subject’). This blockage 
is constitutive, as, paradoxically, the Subject persists only in as far as its full identity is blocked (by the 
Other) (Žižek 1990, 252-4). 
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